THE FEDERALIST
Reprinted from: The
Federalist, New York; G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1888
The Necessity of an Energetic and Active National
Government
No. 23
by Alexander Hamilton
To the People of the State
of
The necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic with the
one proposed, to the preservation of the
This inquiry will naturally divide itself into three branches - the
objects to be provided for by the federal government, the quantity of power necessary
to the accomplishment of those objects, the persons upon whom that power ought
to operate. Its distribution and organization will more properly claim our attention
under the succeeding head.
The principal purposes to be answered by union are these - the common
defence of the members; the preservation of the public peace, as well against
internal convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of commerce with other
nations and between the States; the superintendence of our intercourse, political
and commercial, with foreign countries.
The authorities essential to the common defence are these: to raise
armies; to build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for the government of both;
to direct their operations; to provide for their support. These powers ought to
exist without limitation, because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent
and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent extent and variety of
the means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The circumstances that endanger
the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no constitutional shackles
can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed. This
power ought to be co-extensive with all the possible combinations of such circumstances;
and ought to be under the direction of the same councils which are appointed to
preside over the common defence.
This is one of those truths which to a correct and unprejudiced mind, carries
its own evidence along with it; and may be obscured, but cannot be made plainer
by argument or reasoning. It rests upon axioms as simple as they are universal;
the means ought to be proportioned to the end; the persons, from whose agency
the attainment of any end is
expected, ought to possess the means by which it is to be attained.
Whether there ought to be a federal government intrusted with the care of
the common defence, is a question in the first instance, open for discussion;
but the moment it is decided in the affirmative, it will follow, that that
government ought to be clothed with all the powers requisite to complete execution
of its trust. And unless it can be shown that the circumstances which may affect
the public safety are reducible within certain determinate limits; unless the
contrary of this position can be fairly and rationally disputed, it must be
admitted, as a necessary consequence, that there can be no limitation of that
authority which is to provide for the defence and protection of community, in any
matter essential to its efficace - that is, in any matter essential to the
formation, direction, or support of the National Forces.
Defective as the present Confederation has been proved to be, this
principle appears to have been fully recognized by the framers of it; though
they have not made proper or adequate provision for its exercise. Congress have
an unlimited discretion to make requisitions of men and money; to govern the
army and navy; to direct their operations. As their requisitions are made constitutionally
binding upon the State, who are in fact under the most solemn obligations to furnish
the supplies required of them, the intention evidently was, that the
The experiment has, however, demonstrated that this expectation was
ill-founded and illusory; and the observations, made under the last head, will,
I imagine, have sufficed to convince the impartial and discerning, that there
is no absolute necessity for an entire change in the first principles of the
system; that if we are in earnest about giving the Union energy and duration , we
must abandon the vain project of legislating upon the Stated in their
collective capacities; we must extend the laws of the federal government to the
individual citizens of America; we must discard the fallacious scheme of quotas
and requisitions, as equally impracticable and unjust. The result from all this
is that the Union ought to be invested with full power to levy troops; to build
and equip fleets; and to raise the revenues which will be required for the
formation and support of an army and navy, in the customary and ordinary modes
practised in other governments.
If the circumstances of our country are such as to demand a compound
instead of a simple, a confederate instead of a sole, government, the essential
point which will remain to be adjusted will be to discriminate the objects as
far as it can be done, which shall appertain to the different provinces or
departments of power; allowing to each the most ample authority for fulfilling the
objects committed to its charge. Shall the
Who so likely to make suitable provisions for the public defence, as
that body to which the guardianship of the public safety is confided; which, as
the centre of information, will best understand the extent and urgency of the
dangers that threaten; as the representative of the whole, will feel itself
most deeply interested in the preservation of every part; which, from the responsibility
implied in the duty assigned to it, will be most sensibly impressed with the
necessity of proper exertions; and which, by the extension of its authority
throughout the States, can alone establish uniformity and concert in the plans
and measures by which the common safety is to be secured? Is there not a manifest
inconsistency in devolving upon the federal government the care of the general defence,
and leaving in the State governments the effective powers by which it is to be provided
for? Is not a want of co-operation the infallible consequence of such a system?
And will not weakness, disorder, and undue distribution of the burdens and
calamities of war, an unnecessary and intolerable increase of expense, be its
natural and inevitable concomitants? Have we not had unequivocal experience of its
effects in the course of the revolution which we have just accomplished?
Every view we may take of the subject, as candid inquirers after truth,
will serve to convince us, that is it both unwise and dangerous to deny the
federal government an unconfined authority, as to all those objects which are
intrusted to its management. It will indeed deserve the most vigilant and
careful attention of the people, to see that it be modelled in such a manner as
to admit of its being safely vested with the requisite powers. If any plan which
has been, or may be, offered to our consideration, should not, upon a
dispassionate inspection, be found to answer this description, it ought to be
rejected. A government, the constitution of which renders it unfit to be
trusted with all of the powers which a free people ought to delegate to any
government, would be an unsafe and improper depositary of the National Interests.
Wherever these can with propriety be confided, the coincident powers may safely
accompany them. This is the true result of all just reasoning upon the subject.
And the adversaries of the plan promulgated by the convention ought to have
confined themselves to showing, that the internal structure of the proposed
government was such as to render it unworthy of the confidence of the people. They
ought not to have wandered into inflammatory declamations and unmeaning cavils about
the extent of the powers. The Powers are not too extensive for the Objects of federal administration, or,
in other words, for the management of our National Interests; nor can any satisfactory argument be framed to show
that they are chargeable with such an excess. If it be true, as has been
insinuated by some of the writers on the other side, that the difficulty arises
from the nature of the thing, and that the extent of the country will not
permit us to form a government in which such ample powers can safely be reposed,
it would prove that we ought to contract our views, and resort to the expedient
of separate confederacies, which will move within more practicable spheres. For
the absurdity must continually stare us in the face of confiding to a
government the direction of the most essential national interests, without daring
to trust it to the authorities which are indispensable to their proper and efficient
management. Let us not attempt to reconcile contradictions, but firmly embrace
a rational alternative.
I trust, however, that the impracticability of one general system
cannot be shown. I am greatly mistaken, if any thing of weight has yet been
advanced of this tendency; and I flatter myself, that the observations which
have been made in the course of these papers have served to place the reverse of
that position in as clear a light as any matter still in the womb of time and
experience can be susceptible of. This, at all events, must be evident, that
the very difficulty itself, drawn from the extent of the country, is the
strongest argument in favor of an energetic government; for any other can
certainly never preserve the
Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
No. 24
To Provide
for the Common Defense
To the People of the State of
To the powers proposed to the conferred upon the federal government, in
respect to the creation and direction of the national forces, I have met with but
one specific objection, which, if I understand it right, is this, - That proper
provision has not been made against the existence of standing armies in time of
peace; an objection which, I shall now endeavor to show, rests on weak and
unsubstantial foundations.
It has indeed been brought forward in the most vague and general form, supported
only by bold assertions, without the appearance of argument; without even the
sanction of theoretical opinions; in contradiction to the practice of other free
nations and to the general sense of
A stranger to our politics, who was to read our newspapers at the
present juncture, without having previously inspected the plan reported by the convention,
would be naturally led to one of two conclusions: either that it contained a positive
injunction, that standing armies should be kept up in time of peace; or that it
vested in the executive the whole power of levying troops without subjecting
his discretion, in any shape, to the control of the legislature.
If he came afterwards to peruse the plan itself, he would he surprised to
discover, that neither the one nor the other was the case; that the whole power
of raising armies was lodged in the Legislature, not in the Executive; that
this legislature was to be a popularbody, consisting ofthe representatives of
the people periodically elected; and that instead of the provision he had supposed
in favor of standing armies, there was to be found, in respect to this object, an
important qualification even of the legislative discretion, in that clause
which forbids the appropriation of money for the support of an army for any
longer period than two years - a precaution which, upon a nearer view of it,
will appear to be a great and real security against the keeping up of troops
without evident necessity.
Disappointed in this first surmise, the person I have supposed would be
apt to pursue his conjectures a little further. He would naturally say to
himself, it is impossible that all this vehement and pathetic declamation can
be without some colorable pretext. It must needs be that this people, so jealous
of their liberties, have, in all the preceding models of the constitutions
which they have established, inserted the most precise and rigid precautions on
this point, the omission of which, in the new plan, has given birth to all this
apprehension and clamor.[sic]
If, under this impression, he proceeded to pass in review the several State
constitutions, how great would be his disappointment to find that two only of them
contained an interdiction of standing armies in time of peace; that the other
eleven had either observed a profound silence on the subject, or had in express
terms admitted the right of the Legislature to authorize their existence.
Still, however, he would be persuaded that there must be some plausible
foundation for the cry raised on this head. He would never be able to imagine,
while any source of information remained unexplored, that it was nothing more than
an experiment upon the public credulity, dictated either by a deliberate intention
to deceive, or by the overflowings of a zeal too intemperate to be ingenuous. It
would probably occur to him, that he would be likely to find the precautions he
was in search of in the primitive compact between the States. Here, at length, he
would expect to meet with a solution of the enigma. No doubt, he would observe to
himself, theexisting Confederation must contain the most explicit provisions
against military establishments in time of peace; and a departure from this
model, in a favorite point, has occasioned the discontent which appears to influence
these political champions.;
If he should now apply himself to a careful and critical survey of the articles
of Confederation, his astonishment would not only be increased, but would acquire
a mixture of indignation, at the unexpected discovery, that these article, instead
of containing the prohibition he looked for, and though they had, with jealous
circumspection, restricted the authority of the State legislatures in this particular,
had not imposed a single restraint on that of the United States. If he happened
to be a man of quick sensibility, or ardent temper, he could now no longer
refrain from regarding these clamors as the dishonest artifices of a sinister and
unprincipled opposition to a plan which ought at least to receive a fair and candid
examination from all sincere lovers of their country! How else, he would say, could
the authors of them have been tempted to vent such loud censures upon that
plan, about a point in which it seems to have conformed itself to the general sense
of America as declared in its different forms of government, and in which it
has even super-added a new and powerful guard unknown to any of them? If, on
the contrary, he happened to be a man calm and dispassionate feelings, he would
indulge a sigh for the frailty of human nature, and would lament, that in a
matter so interesting to the happiness of millions, the true merits of the question
should be perplexed and entangled by expedients so unfriendly to an impartial and
right determination. Even such a man could hardly forbear remarking, that a
conduct of this kind has too much the appearance of an intention to mislead the
people by alarming their passions, rather than to convince them by arguments
addressed to their understandings.
But however little this
objection may be countenanced, even by precedents among ourselves, it may be
satisfactory to take a nearer view of its intrinsic merits. From a close examination
it will appear that restraints upon the discretion of the legislature in respect
to military establishments in time of peace, would be improper to be imposed,
and if imposed, from the necessities of society, would be unlikely to be observed.
Though a wide ocean separates the
Previous to the Revolution, and ever since the peace, there has been a constant
necessity for keeping small garrisons on our Western frontier. No person can
doubt that these will continue to be indispensable, if it should only be
against the ravages and depredations of the Indians. These garrisons must either
be furnished by occasional detachments from the militia, or by permanent corps in
the pay of the government. The first is impracticable; and if practicable,
would be pernicious. The militia would not long, if at all, submit to be dragged
from their occupations and families to perform that most disagreeable duty in times
of profound peace. And if they could be prevailed upon or compelled to do it, the
increased expense of a frequent rotation of service, and the loss of labor and
disconcertion of the industrious pursuits of individuals, would form conclusive
objections to the scheme. It would be as burdensome and injurious to the public
as ruinous to private citizens. The latter resource of permanent corps in the
pay of the government amounts to a standing army in time of peace; a small one,
indeed, but not the less real for being small. Here is a simple view of the
subject, that shows us at once the impropriety of a constitutional interdiction
ofsuch establishments, and the necessity of leaving the matter to the
discretion and prudence of the legislature.
In proportion to our increase in strength, it is probable, nay, it may
be said certain, that
If we mean to be a commercial people, or even to be secure on our
Atlantic side, we must endeavor, as soon as possible, to have a navy. To this
purpose there must be dock-yards, and sometimes of the fleet itself.
Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
NO. 25
The States
and the Common Defense
To the People of the State of
It may perhaps be urged that the objects enumerated in the preceding
number ought to be provided for the Sate governments, under the direction of
the
The territories of
Reasons have been already given to induce a supposition that the State
governments will too naturally be prone to a rivalship with that of the Union, the
foundation of which will be the love of power; and that in any contest between the
federal head and one of its members the people will be most apt to unite with their
local government. If, in addition to this immense advantage, the ambition of the
members should be stimulated by the separate and independent possession of military
forces, it would afford too strong a temptation and too great a facility to them
to make enterprises upon, and finally to subvert, the constitutional authority
of the
The framers of theexisting Confederation, fully aware of the danger to
the Union from the separate possession of military forces by the States, have, in
express terms, prohibited them from having either ships or troops, unless with the
consent of congress. The truth is, that the existence of a federal government and
military establishments under State authority are not less at variance with
each other than a due supply of the federal treasury and the system of quotas
and requisitions.
There are other lights besides those already taken notice of, in which the
impropriety of restraints on the discretion of the national legislature will be
equally manifest. The design of the objection, which has been mentioned, is to
preclude standing armies in time of peace, though we have never been informed how
far it is designed the prohibition should extend: whether to raising armies as well
as to keeping them up in a season of tranquillity or not. If it be confined to the
latter it will have no precise signification, and it will be ineffectual for
the purpose intended. When armies are once raised what shall be denominated "keeping
them up," contrary to the sense of the Constitution? What time shall be requisite
to ascertain the violation? Shall it be a week, a month, a year? Or shall we
say they may be continued as long as the danger which occasioned their being raised
continues? This would be to admit that they might be kept up in time of peace, against
threatening or impending danger, which would be at once to deviate from the
literal meaning of the prohibition, and to introduce an extensive latitude of
construction. Who shall judge of the continuance of the danger? This must
undoubtedly be submitted to the national government, and the matter would then be
brought to this issue, that the national government, to provide against apprehended
danger, might in the first instance raise troops, and might afterwards keep them
on foot as long as they supposed the peace or safety of the community was in
any degree of jeopardy. It is easy to perceive that a discretion so latitudinary
as this would afford ample room for eluding the force of the provision.
The supposed utility of a provision of this kind can only be founded on
the supposed probability, or at least possibility, of a combination between the
executive and legislative, in some scheme of usurpation. Should this at any
time happen, how easy would it be to fabricate pretences of approaching danger!
Indian hostilities, instigated by
If, to obviate this consequence, it should be resolved to extend the prohibition
to the raising of armies in time of peace, the United States would then exhibit
the most extraordinary spectacle which the world has yet seen, - that of a
nation incapacitated by its Constitution to prepare for defence, before it was actually
invaded. As the ceremony of a formal denunciation of war has of late fallen
into disuse, the presence of an enemy within our territories must be waited for,
as the legal warrant to the government to begin its levies of men for the
protection of the State. We must receive the blow, before we could even prepare
to return it. All that kind of policy by which nations anticipate distant danger,
and meet the gathering storm, must be abstained from as contrary to the genuine
maxims of a free government. We must expose our property and liberty to the
mercy of foreign invaders, and invite them by our weakness to seize the naked and
defenceless prey, because we are afraid that rulers, created by our choice,
dependent on our will, might endanger that liberty, by an abuse of the means necessary
to its preservation.
Here I expect we shall be told that the militia of the country is its natural
bulwark, and would be at all times equal to the national defence. This doctrine,
in substance, had like to have lost us our independence. It cost millions to
the
All violent policy, as it is contrary to the natural and experienced
course of human affairs, defeats itself.
It was fundamental maxim of the Lacedaemonian commonwealth, that the
post of admiral should not be conferred twice on the same person. The
peloponnesian confederates, having suffered a severe defeat at sea from the Athenians,
demanded Lysander, who had before served with success in that capacity, to command
the combined fleets. The lacedaemonians, to gratify their allies, and yet
preserve the semblance of an adherence to their ancient institutions, had
recourse to the flimsy subterfuge of investing Lysander with the real power of
admiral, under the nominal title of vice-admiral. This instance is selected
from among a multitude that might be cited to confirm the truth already
advanced and illustrated by domestic examples; with is, that nations pay little
regard to rules and maxims calculated in their very nature to run counter to the
necessities of society. Wise politicians will be cautious about fettering the
government with restrictions that cannot be observed, because they know that
every branch of the fundamental laws, though dictated by necessity, impairs that
sacred reverence which ought to be maintained in the breast of rulers towards
the constitution of a country, and forms a precedent for other breaches where the
same plea of necessity does not exist at all, or is less urgent and palpable.
Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
No. 26
The Powers of
Congress and the Common Defense
To the People of the State of
It was thing hardly to be expected that in a popular revolution the
minds of men should stop at the happy mean which marks the salutary boundary between
Power and Privilege, and combines the energy of government with the security of
private rights. A failure in this delicate and important point is the great
source of the inconveniences we experience, and if we are not cautious to avoid
a repetition of the error, in our future attempts to rectify and ameliorate our
system, we may travel from one chimerical project to another; we may try change
after change; but we shall never be likely to make any material change for the
better.
The idea of restraining the legislative authority, in the means of
providing for the national defence, is one of those refinements which owe their
origin to a zeal for liberty more ardent than enlightened. We have seen,
however, that it has not had thus far an extensive prevalency; that even in this
country, where it made its first appearance, Pennsylvania and North Carolina
are the only two States by which it has been in any degree patronized; and that
all the others have refused to give it the lease countenance; wisely judging
that confidence must be placed somewhere; that the necessity of doing it, is
implied in the very act of delegating power; and that it is better to hazard
the abuse of that confidence than to embarrass the government and endanger the
public safety by impolitic restrictions on the legislative authority. The opponents
of the proposed Constitution combat, in the respect, the general decision of
America; and instead of being taught by experience the propriety of correcting any
extremes into which we may have heretofore run, they appear disposed to conduct
us into still more dangerous, and more extravagant. As if the tone of government
had been found too high, or too rigid, the doctrines they teach are calculated to
induce us to depress or to relax it, by expedients which, upon other occasions,
have been condemned or forborne. It may be affirmed without the imputation of
invective, that if the principles they inculcate, on various points, could so far
obtain as to become the popular creed, they would utterly unfit the people of this
country for any species of government whatever. But a danger of this kind is not
to be apprehended. The citizens of
It may not be amiss in this place concisely to remark the origin and progress
of the idea, which aims at the exclusion of military establishments in time of peace.
Though in speculative minds it may arise from a contemplation of the nature and
tendency of such institutions, fortified by the events that have happened in other
ages and countries, yet as a national sentiment, it must be traced to those
habits of thinking which we derive from the nation from whom the inhabitants of
these States have in general sprung.
In
In that kingdom, when the pulse of liberty was at its highest pitch, no
security against the danger of standing armies was thought requisite, beyond a prohibition
of their being raised or kept up by the mere authority of the executive
magistrate. The patriots, who effected that memorable revolution, were too
temperate, too well-informed to think of any restraint on the legislative
discretion. They were aware that a certain number of troops for guards and
garrisons were indispensable; that no precise bounds could be set to the national
exigencies; that a power equal to every possible contingency must exist
somewhere in the government: and that when they referred th exercise of the
power to the judgment of the legislature, they had arrived at the ultimate point
of precaution which was reconcilable with the safety of the community.
From the same source, the people of
It is remarkable, that even in the two States which seem to have meditated
an interdiction of military establishments in time of peace, the mode of expression
made use of is rather cautionary than prohibitory. It is not said, that standing
armies shall not be kept up, but that they ought not to be kept up, in time of
peace. This ambiguity of terms appears to have been the result of a conflict between
jealousy and conviction; between the desire of excluding such establishments at
all events, and the persuasion that an absolute exclusion would be unwise and
unsafe.
Can it be doubted that such a provision, whenever the situation of
public affairs was understood to require a departure from it, would be
interpreted by the legislature into a mere admonition , and would be made to
yield to the necessities or supposed necessities of the State? Let the fact
already mentioned, with respect to
Let us examine whether there by any comparison, in point of efficacy,
between the provision alluded to and that which is contained in the new Constitution,
for restraining the appropriations of money for military purposes to the period
of two years. The former, by aiming at too much, is calculated to effect
nothing; the latter, by steering clear of an imprudent extreme, and by being
perfectly compatible with a proper provision for the exigencies of the nation,
will have a salutary and powerful operation.
The legislature of the
Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community require time to
mature them for execution. An army, so large as seriously to menace those
liberties, could only be formed by progressive augmentations; which would suppose,
not merely a temporary combination between the legislature and executive, but a
continued conspiracy for a series of tome. Is it probable that such a
combination would exist at all? Is it probable that it would be persevered in, and
transmitted along through all the successive variations in a representative body,
which biennial elections would naturally produce in both houses? Is it
presumable, that every man, the instant he took his seat in the national Senate
of House of Representatives, would commence a traitor to his constituents and to
his country? Can it be supposed that there would not be found one man, discerning
enough to detect so atrocious a conspiracy, or bold or honest enough to apprise
his constituents of their danger? If such presumptions can fairly be made,
there ought at once to be an end of all delegated authority. The people should resolve
to recall all the powers they have heretofore parted with out of their own
hands, and to divide themselves into as many States as there are counties, in
order that they may be able to manage their own concerns in person.
If such suppositions could even be reasonably made, still the
concealment of the design, for any duration, would be impracticable. It would
be announced, by the very circumstance of augmenting the army to so great an
extent in time of profound peace. What colorable reason could be assigned, in a
country so situated, for such vast augmentations of the military force? It is
impossible that the people could be long deceived: and the destruction of the
project, and of the projectors, would quickly follow the discovery.
It has been said that the provision which limits the appropriation of
money for the support of an army to the period of two years would be unavailing,
because the Executive, when once possessed of a force large enough to awe the people
into submission, would find resources in that very force sufficient to enable
him to dispense with supplies from the acts of the legislature. But the
question again recurs, upon what pretence would he be put in possession of a
force of that magnitude in time of peace? If we suppose it to have been created
in consequence of some domestic insurrection or foreign war, then it becomes a case
not within the principles of the objection; for this is levelled against the
power of keeping up troops in time of peace. Few persons will be so visionary
as seriously to contend that military forces ought not to be raised to quell a
rebellion or resist an invasion; and if the defence of the community under such
circumstances should make it necessary to have an army so numerous as to hazard
its liberty, this is one of those calamities for which there is neither
preventative nor cure. It cannot be provided against by any possible form of government;
it might even result from a simple league offensive and defensive, if it should
ever be necessary for the confederates or allies to form an army for common
defence.
But it is an evil infinitely less likely to attend us in a united that
in a disunited state; nay, it may be safely asserted that it is an evil
altogether unlikely to attend us in the latter situation. It is not easy to
conceive a possibility that dangers so formidable can assail the whole
Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
No. 27
The Enforcement of the Supreme Law of the Land
To the People of
the State of
It has been urged, in different shapes, that a Constitution of the kind
proposed by the convention cannot operate without the aid of a military force
to execute its laws. This, however, like most other things that have been alleged
on that side, rests on mere general assertion, unsupported by any precise or intelligible
designation of the reasons upon which it is founded. As far as I have been able
to divine the latent meaning of the objectors, it seems to originate in a
presupposition that the people will be disinclined to the exercise of federal
authority in any matter of an internal nature. Waiving any exception that might
be taken to the inaccuracy or inexplicitness of the distinction between the internal
and external, let us inquire what ground there is to presuppose that disinclination
in the people. Unless we presume at the same time that the powers of the general
government will be worse administered than those of the State government, there
seems to be no room for the presumption of ill-will, disaffection, or
opposition in the people. I believe it may be laid down as a general rule that
their confidence in and obedience to a government will commonly be proportioned
to the goodness or badness of its administration. It must be admitted that
there are exceptions to this rule; but these exceptions depend so entirely on accidental
causes, that they cannot be considered as having any relation to the intrinsic
merits or demerits of a constitution. These can only be judged of by general
principles and maxims.
Various reasons have been suggested, in the course of these papers, to induce
a probability that the general government will be better administered than the particular
governments: the principal of which reasons are that the extension of the spheres
of election will present a greater option, or latitude of choice, to the people;
that through the medium of the State legislatures - which are select bodies of
men, and which are to appoint the members of the national Senate - there is
reason to expect that this branch will generally be composed with peculiar care
and judgment; that these circumstances promise greater knowledge and more extensive
information in the national councils, and that they will be less apt to be
tainted by the spirit of faction, and more out of the reach of those occasional
ill-humors, or temporary prejudices and propensities, which, in smaller societies,
frequently contaminate the public councils, beget injustice and oppression of a
part of the community, and engender schemes which, though they gratify a
momentary inclination or desire, terminate in general distress dissatisfaction,
and disgust.Several additional reasons of considerable force, to fortify that
probability, will occur when we come to survey, with a more critical eye, the
interior structure of the edifice which we are invited to erect. It will be sufficient
here to remark, that until satisfactory reasons can be assigned to justify an
opinion, that the federal government is likely to be administered in such a
manner as to render it odious or contemptible to the people, there can be no
reasonable foundation for the supposition that the laws of the Union will meet
with any greater obstruction from them, or will stand in need of any other
methods to enforce their execution, than the laws of the particular members.
The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition; the dread of
punishment, a proportionably strong discouragement to it. Will not the
government of the
I will, in this place, hazard an observation, which will not be the
less just because to some it may appear new; which is, that the more the
operations of the national authority are intermingled in the ordinary exercise
of government, the more the citizens are accustomed to meet with it in the common
occurrences of their political life, the more it is familiarized to their sight
and to their feelings, the further it enters into those objects which touch the
most sensible chords and put in motion the most active springs of the human
heart, the greater will be the probability that it will conciliate the respect
and attachment of the community. Man is very much a creature of habit. A thing that
rarely strikes his senses will generally have but little influence upon his mind.
A government continually at a distance and out of sight can hardly be expected to
interest the sensations of the people. The inference is, that the authority of the
One thing, at all events, must be evident, that a government like the one
proposed would bid much fairer to avoid the necessity of using force, than that
species of league contended for by most of its opponents; the authority of
which should only operate upon the States in their political or collective
capacities. It has been shown that in such a Confederacy there can be no sanction
for the laws but force; that frequent delinquencies in the members are the
natural offspring of the very frame of the government; and that as often as these
happen, they can only be redressed, if at all, by war and violence.
The plan reported by the convention, by extending the authority of the
federal head to the individual citizens of the several States, will enable the
government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each, in the execution of its laws.
It is easy to perceive that this will tend to destroy, in the common apprehension,
all distinction between the sources from which they might proceed; and will
give the federal government the same advantage for securing a due obedience to
its authority which is enjoyed by the government of each State, in addition to the
influence on public opinion which will result from the important consideration
of its having power to call to its assistance and support the resources of the
whole Union. It merits particular attention in this place, that the laws of the
Confederacy, as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of its jurisdiction,
will become the supreme law of the land; to the observance of which all
officers, legislative executive, and judicial, in each State, will be bound by
the sanctity of an oath. Thus the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the
respective members, will be incorporated into the operations of the national
government as far as its just and constitutional authority extends; and will be
rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws. Any man who will perceive
that there is good ground to calculate upon a regular and peaceable execution of
the laws of the
Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
No. 28
A National Army and Internal Security
To the People of the State of
That there may happen cases in which the national government may be necessitated
to resort to force, cannot be denied. OUr own experience has corroborated the lessons
taught by the examples of other nations; that emergencies of this sort will
sometimes arise in all societies, however constituted; that seditions and
insurrections are, unhappily, maladies as inseparable from the body politic as tumors
and eruptions from the natural body; that the idea of governing at all times by
the simple force of law (which we have been told is the only admissible
principle of republican government:, has no place but in the reveries of those
political doctors whose sagacity disdains the admonitions of experimental
instruction.
Should such emergencies at any time happen under the national
government, there could be no remedy but force. The means to be employed must be
proportioned to the extent of the mischief. If it should be a slight commotion
in a small part of a State, the militia of the residue would be adequate to its
suppression; and the natural presumption is that they would be ready to do
their duty. An insurrection, whatever may be its immediate cause, eventually
endangers all government. Regard to the public peace, if not to the rights of
the Union, would engage the citizens to whom the contagion had not communicated
itself to oppose the insurgents; and if the general government should be found
in practice conducive to the prosperity and felicity of the people, it were
irrational to believe that they would be disinclined to its support.
If, on the contrary, the insurrection should pervade a whole State, or
a principal part of it, the employment of a different kind of force might
become unavoidable. It appears that
Let us presume this examination in another light. Suppose, in lieu of one
general system, two, or three, or even four Confederacies were to be formed, would
not the same difficulty oppose itself to the operations of either of these Confederacies?
Would not each of them be exposed to the same casualties; and when these happened,
be obliged to have recourse to the same expedients for upholding its authority which
are objected to in a government for all the States? Would the militia, in this
supposition, be more ready or more able to support the federal authority than in
the case of a general union? All candid and intelligent men must, upon due
consideration, acknowledge that the principle of the objection is equally
applicable to either of the two cases; and that whether we have one government for
all the States, or different governments for different parcels of them, or even
if there should be an entire separation of the States, there might sometimes be
a necessity to make use of a force constituted differently from the militia, to
preserve the peace of the community and to maintain the just authority of the laws
against those violent invasions of them which amount to insurrections and
rebellions.
Independent of all other reasonings upon the subject, it is a full
answer to those who require a more peremptory provision against military
establishments in time of peace, to say that the whole powers of the proposed
government is to be in the hands of the representatives of the people. This is the
essential, and, after all, only efficacious security for the rights and
privileges of the people, which is attainable in civil society.
If the representatives of the people betray their constituents, there
is then no resource left but in the exertion of that original right of self-defence
which is paramount to all positive forms of government, and which against the
usurpations of the national rulers, may be exerted with infinitely better
prospect of success than against those of the rulers of an individual state. In
a single state, if the persons intrusted with supreme power become usurpers,
the different parcels, subdivisions, or districts of which it consists, having no
distinct government in each, can take no regular measures for defence. The citizens
must rush tumultuously to arms, without concert, without system, without resource,
except in their courage and despair. The usurpers, clothed with the forms of legal
authority, can too often crush the opposition in embryo. The smaller the extent
of the territory, the more difficult will it be for the people to form a
regular or systematic plan of opposition, and the more easy will it be to
defeat their early efforts. Intelligence can be more speedily obtained of their
preparations and movements, and the military force in the possession of the
usurpers can be more rapidly directed against the part where the opposition has
begun. In this situation there must be a peculiar coincidence of circumstances
to insure success to the popular resistance.
The obstacles to usurpation and the facilities of resistance increase with
the increased extent of the state, provided the citizens understand their rights
and are disposed to defend them. The natural strength of the people in a large community,
in proportion to the artificial strength of the government, is greater than in a
small, and of course more competent to a struggle with the attempts of the government
to establish a tyranny. But in a confederacy the people, without exaggeration,
may be said to be entirely the masters of their own fate. Power being almost
always the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand ready
to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same
disposition towards the general government. The people, by throwing themselves
into either scale, will infallibly make it preponderate. If their rights are
invaded by either, they can make use of the other as the instrument of redress.
How wise will it be in them by cherishing the union to preserve to themselves
an advantage which can never be too highly prized!
It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system, that the
State governments will, in all possible contingencies, afford complete security
against invasions of the public liberty by the national authority. Projects of
usurpation cannot be masked under pretences so likely to escape the penetration
of select bodies of men, as of the people at large. The legislatures will have
better means of information. They can discover the danger at a distance; and
possessing all the organs of civil power, and the confidence of the peop-le,
they can at once adopt a regular plan of opposition, in which they can combine
all the resources of the community. They can readily communicate with each
other in the different States, and unite their common forces for the protection
of their common liberty.
The great extent of the country is a further security. We have already
experiences its utility against the attacks of a foreign power. And it would have
precisely the same effect against the enterprises of ambitious rulers in the
national councils. If the federal army should be able to quell the resistance
of one State, the distant States would have it in their power to make head with
fresh forces. The advantages obtained in one place must be abandoned to subdue
the opposition in others; and the moment the part which had been reduced to
submission was left to itself, its efforts would be renewed, and its resistance
revive.
We should recollect that the extent of the military force must, at all events,
be regulated by the resources of the country. For a long time to come, it will not
be possible to maintain a large army; and as the means of doing this increase,
the population and natural strength of the community will proportionably
increase. When will the time arrive that the federal government can raise and maintain
an army capable of erecting a despotism over the great body of the people of an
immense empire, who are in a situation, through the medium of their State
governments, to take measures for their own defence, with all the celerity, regularity,
and system of independent nations? The apprehension may be considered as a disease,
for which there can be found no cure in the resources of argument and reasoning.
Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
No. 29
The
Regulation of the Militia
To the People of the State of
The power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its services in times
of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents to the duties of
superintending the common defence, and of watching over the internal peace of
the Confederacy.
It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that uniformity in
the organization and discipline of the militia would be attended with the most beneficial
effects, whenever they were called into service for the public defence. It would
enable them to discharge the duties of the camp and of the field with mutual
intelligence and concert - an advantage of peculiar moment in the operations of
an army; and it would fit them much sooner to acquire the degree of proficiency
in military functions which would be essential to their usefulness. This
desirable uniformity can only be accomplished by confiding the regulation of
the militia to the direction of the national authority. It is therefore, with the
most evident propriety, that the plan of the convention proposes to empower the
Union "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and
for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United
States, reserving to the states respectively the appointment of the officers, and
the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by
Congress."
Of the different grounds which have been taken in opposition to the plan
of the convention, there is none that was so little to have been expected, or
is so untenable in itself, as the one from which this particular provision has been
attacked. If a well-regulated militia be the most natural defence of a free
country, it ought certainly to be under the regulation and at the disposal of
that body which is constituted the guardian of the national security. If
standing armies are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power over the
militia, in the body to whose care the protection of the State is committed,
ought, as far as possible, to take away the inducement and the pretext to such
unfriendly institutions. If the federal government can command the aid of the
militia in those emergencies which call for the military arm in support of the civil
magistrate, it can the better dispense with the employment of a different kind
of force. If it cannot avail itself of the former, it will be obliged to recur
to the latter. To render an army unnecessary, will be a more certain method of
preventing its existence than a thousand prohibitions upon paper.
In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling forth the militia
to execute the laws of the Union, it has been remarked that there is nowhere any
provision in the proposed Constitution for calling out the posse comitatus, to
assist the magistrate in the execution of his duty; whence it has been
inferred, that military force was intended to be his only auxiliary. There is a
striking incoherence in the objections which have appeared, and sometimes even
from the same quarter, not much calculated to inspire a very favorable opinion
of the sincerity or fair dealing of their authors. The same persons who tell us
in one breath, that the powers of the federal government will be despotic and unlimited,
inform us in the next, that it has not authority sufficient even to call out
the posse comitatus. The latter, fortunately, is as much short of the truth as
the former exceeds it. It would be as absurd to doubt, that a right to pass all
laws necessary and proper to execute its declared powers would include that of
requiring the assistance of the citizens to the officers who may be intrusted with
the execution of those laws, as it would be to believe, that a right to enact
laws necessary and proper for the imposition and collection of taxes would
involve that of varying the rules of descent and of the alienation of landed property,
or of abolishing the trial by jury in cases relating to it. It being therefore evident
that the supposition of a want of power to require the aid of the posse comitatus
is entirely destitute of color, it will follow, that the conclusion which has
been drawn from it, in its application to the authority of the federal
government over the militia, is as uncandid as it is illogical. What reason could
there be to infer, that force was intended to be the sole instrument of
authority, merely because there is a power to make use of it when necessary?
What shall we think of the motives which could induce men of sense to reason in
this manner? How shall we prevent a conflict between charity and judgment?
By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican jealousy, we are
even taught to apprehend danger from the militia itself, in the hands of the
federal government. It is observed that select corps may be formed, composed of
the young and ardent, who may be rendered subservient to the views of arbitrary
power. What plan for the regulation of the militia may be pursues by the
national government, is impossible to be foreseen. But so far from viewing the
matter in the same light with those who object to select corps as dangerous, were
the Constitution ratified, and were I to deliver my sentiments to a member of the
federal legislature from this State on the subject of a militia establishment,
I should hold to him, in substance, the following discourse:
"The project of disciplining all the militia of the
"But though the scheme of disciplining the whole nation must be abandoned
as mischievous or impracticable; yet it is a matter of the utmost importance
that a well-digested plan should, as soon as possible, be adopted for the
proper establishment of the militia. The attention of the government ought particularly
to be directed to the formation of a select corps of moderate extent, upon such
principles as will really fit them for service in case of need. By thus circumscribing
the plan, it will be possible to have an excellent body of well-trained militia,
ready to take the field whenever the defence of the State shall require it. This
will not only lessen the call for military establishments, but if circumstances
should at any time oblige the government to form an army of any magnitude that army
can never be formidable to the liberties of the people while there is a large body
of citizens, little, if at all, inferior to them in discipline and the use of
arms,who stand ready to defend their own rights and those of their fellow-citizens.
This appears to me the only substitute that can be devised for standing army, and
the best possible security against it, if it should exist."
Thus differently from the adversaries of the proposed Constitution
should I reason on the same subject, deducing arguments of safety from the very
sources which they represent as fraught with danger and perdition. But how the
national legislature may reason on the point, is a thing which neither they nor
I can foresee.
There is something so far-fetched and so extravagant in the idea of
danger to liberty from the militia, that one is at a loss whether to treat it
with gravity or with raillery; whether to consider it as a mere trial of skill,
like the paradoxes of rhetoricians; as a disingenuous artifice to instill prejudices
at any price; or as the serious offspring of political fanaticism. Where, in
the name of common-sense, are our fears to end if we may not trust our sons,
our brothers, our neighbors, our fello-citizens? What shadow of danger can
there be from men who are daily mingling with the rest of their countrymen, and
who participate with them in the same feelings, sentiments, habits, and
interests? What reasonable cause of apprehension can be inferred from a power
in the
In reading many of the publications against the Constitution, a man is apt
to imagine that he is perusing some ill-written tale or romance, which, instead
of natural and agreeable images, exhibits to the mind nothing but frightful and
distorted shapes--
"Gorgons, hydras, and chimeras
dire";
discoloring and disfiguring whatever it represents, and transforming
every thing it touches into a monster.
A sample of this is to be observed in the exaggerated and improbable suggestions
which have taken place respecting the power of calling for the services of the militia.
That of
If there should be an army to be made use of as the engine of
despotism, what need of the militia? If there should be no army, whither would
the militia, irritated by being called upon to undertake a distant and hopeless
expedition, for the purpose of riveting the chains of slavery upon a part of
their countrymen,m direct their course, but to the seat of the tyrants, who had
meditated so foolish as well as so wicked a project, to crush them in their
imagined intrenchments of power,and to make them an example of the just
vengeance of an abused and incensed people? Is this the way in which usurpers
stride to dominion over a numerous and enlightened nation? Do they begin by exciting
the detestation of the very instruments of their intended usurpations? Do they usually
commence their career by wanton and disgustful acts of power, calculated to
answer no end, but to draw upon themselves universal hatred and execration? Are
suppositions of this sort the sober admonitions of discerning patriots to a
discerning people? Or are they the inflammatory ravings of incendiaries or
distempered enthusiasts? If we were even to suppose the national rulers
actuated by the most ungovernable ambition, it is impossible to believe that they
would employ such preposterous means to accomplish their designs.
In times of insurrection, or invasion, it would be natural and proper that
the militia of a neighboring State should be marched into another, to resist a common
enemy, or to guard the republic against the violence of faction or sedition. This
was frequently the case, in respect to the first object, in the course of the
late war; and this mutual succor is, indeed, a principal end of our political
association. if the power of affording it be placed under the direction of the
Publius (Alexander Hamilton)
No. 41
Powers Delegated to the General
Government: I
To the People of the State
of
The Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered under two
general points of view. The First relates to the sum or quantity of power which
it vests in the government, including the restraints imposed on the States. The
Second, to the particular structure of the government, and the distribution of
this power among its several branches.
Under the first view of the subject, two important questions arise: l. Whether
any part of the powers transferred to the general government be unnecessary or improper?
2. Whether the entire mass of them be dangerous to the portion of jurisdiction
left in the several States?
Is the aggregate power of the general government greater than ought to have
been vested in it? This is the first question.
It cannot have escaped those who have attended with candor to the arguments
employed against the extensive powers of the government, that the authors of them
have very little considered how far these powers were necessary means of
attaining a necessary end. They have chosen rather to dwell on the
inconveniences which must be unavoidably blended with all political advantages;
and on the possible abuses which must be incident to every power or trust, of
which a beneficial use can be made. This method of handling the subject cannot
impose on the good sense of the people of
That we may form a correct judgment on this subject, it will be proper
to review the several powers conferred on the government of the Union; and that
this may be the more conveniently done they may be reduced into different classes
as they relate to the following deferent objects: 1. Security against foreign
danger; 2. Regulation of the intercourse with foreign nations; 3. Maintenance
of harmony and proper intercourse among the States; 4. Certain miscellaneous
objects of general utility; 5. Restraint of the States from certain injurious acts;
6. Provisions for giving due efficacy to all these powers.
The powers falling within the first class are those of declaring war
and granting letters of marque; of providing armies and fleets; of regulating and
calling forth the militia; of levying and borrowing money.
Security against foreign danger is one of the primitive objects of civil
society. It is an avowed and essential object of the American Union. The powers
requisite for attaining it must be effectually confided to the federal
councils.
Is the power of declaring war necessary? No man will answer this question
in the negative.It would be superfluous, therefore, to enter into a proof of the
affirmative. The existing Confederation establishes this power in the most ample
form.
Is the power of raising armies and equipping fleets necessary? This is involved
in the foregoing power. It is involved in the power of self-defence.
But was it necessary to give an indefinite power of raising troops, as well
as providing fleets; and of maintaining both in peace, as well as in war?
The answer to these questions has been too far anticipated in another
place to admit an extensive discussion of them in this place. The answer indeed
seems to be so obvious and conclusive as scarcely to justify such a discussion
in any place. With what color of propriety could the force necessary for defence
be limited by those who cannot limit the force of offence? If a federal
Constitution could chain the ambition or set bounds to the exertions of all
other nations, then indeed might it prudently chain the discretion of its own
government, and set bounds to the exertions for its own safety.
How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely prohibited,
unless we could prohibit, in like manner, the preparations and establishments
of every hostile nation? The means of security can only be regulated by the
means and the danger of attack. They will, in fact, be ever be ever determined by
these rules, and by no others. It is in vain to oppose constitutional barriers to
the impulse of self-preservation. It is worse than in vain; because it plants in
the Constitution itself necessary usurpations of power, every precedent of
which is a germ of unnecessary and multiplied repetitions. If one nation
maintains constantly a disciplined army, ready for the service of ambition or
revenge, it obliges the most pacific nations who may be within the reach of its
enterprisestotakecorresponding precautions. The fifteenth century was the
unhappy epoch of military establishments in the time of peace. They were
introduced by Charles VII. of
Not the less true is it, that the liberties of
The clearest marks of this prudence are stamped on the proposed Constitution.
The
This picture of the consequences of disunion cannot be too highly
colored, or too often exhibited. Every man who loves liberty, ought to have it
ever before his eyes, that he may cherish in his heart a due attachment to the
Union of America, and be able to set a due value on the means of preserving it.
Next to the effectual establishment of the
Had the argument from the British example been truly stated, it would have
stood thus: The term for which supplies may be appropriated to the army establishment,
though unlimited by the British Constitution, has nevertheless, in practice,
been limited by parliamentary discretion to a single year. Now, if in Great
Britain, where the House of Commons is elected for seven years; where so great a
proportion of the members are elected by so small a proportion of the members are
elected by so small a proportion of the people; where the electors are so corrupted
by the representatives, and the representatives so corrupted by the Crown, the
representative body can possess a power to make appropriations to the army for
an indefinite term, without desiring, or without daring, to extend the term
beyond a single year, ought not suspicion herself to blush, in pretending that the
representatives of the United States, elected freely by the whole body of the people,
every second year, cannot be safely intrusted with the discretion over such
appropriations, expressly limited to the short period of two years?
A bad cause seldom fails to betray itself. Of this truth, the
management of the opposition to the federal government is an unvaried
exemplification. But among all the blunders which have been committed, none is
more striking than the attempt to enlist on that side the prudent jealousy
entertained by the people, of standing armies. The attempt has awakened fully
the public attention to that important subject: and has led to investigations which
must terminate in a thorough and universal conviction, not only that the
Constitution has provided the most effectual guards against danger from that
quarter, but that nothing short of a Constitution fully adequate to the national
defence and the preservation of the Union, can save America from as many
standing armies as it may be split into States and Confederacies, and from such
a progressive augmentation, of these establishments in each, as will render
them as burdensome to the properties and ominous to the liberties of the
people, as any establishment that can become necessary, under a united and
efficient government, must be tolerable to the former and safe to the latter.
The palpable necessity of the power to provide and maintain a navy has protected
that part of the Constitution against a spirit of censure, which has spared few
other parts. It must, indeed, be numbered among the greatest blessings of
The inhabitants of the Atlantic frontier are all of them deeply
interested in this provision for naval protection, and if they have hitherto
been suffered to sleep quietly in their beds; if their property has remained
safe against the predatory spirit of licentious adventurers; if their maritime
towns have not yet been compelled to ransom themselves from the terror of a
conflagration, by yielding to the exactions of daring and sudden invaders, these
instances of good fortune are not to be ascribed to the capacity of the existing
government for the protection of those from whom it claims allegiance, but to
causes that are fugitive and fallacious. If we except perhaps
The power of regulating and calling forth the militia has been already
sufficiently vindicated and explained.
The power of levying and borrowing money, being the sinew of that which
is to be exerted in the national defence, is properly thrown into the same
class with it. This power, also, has been examined already with much attention,
and has, I trust, been clearly shown to be necessary, both in the extent and form
given to it by the Constitution. I will address one additional reflection only
to those who contend that the power ought to have been restrained to external
taxation - by which they mean, taxes on articles imported from other countries.
It cannot be doubted that this will always be a valuable source of revenue; that
for a considerable time it must be a principal source; that at this moment it is
an essential one. But we may form very mistaken ideas on this subject, if we do
not call to mind in our calculations, that the extent of revenue drawn for
foreign commerce must vary with the variations, both in the extent and the kind
of imports; and that these variations do not correspond with the progress of population,
which must be the general measure of the public wants. As long as agriculture
continues the sole field of labor, the importation of manufactures must
increase as the consumers multiply. As soon as domestic manufactures are begun by
the hands not called for by agriculture, the imported manufactures will
decrease as the numbers of people increase. In a more remote stage, the imports
may consist in a considerable part of raw materials, which will be wrought into
articles for exportation, and will, therefore, require rather the encouragement
of bounties, than to be loaded with discouraging duties. A system of government,
meant for duration, ought to contemplate these revolutions, and be able to
accommodate itself to them.
Some, who have not denied the necessity of the power of taxation, have grounded
a very fierce attack against the Constitution, on the language in which it is
defined. It has been urged and echoed, that the power "to lay and collect
taxes, duties, imposts, and excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the
common defence and general welfare of the
Had no other enumeration or definition of the powers of the Congress
been found in the Constitution, than the general expressions just cited, the
authors of the objection might have had some color for it; though it would have
been difficult to find a reason for so awkward a form of describing an
authority to legislate in all possible cases. A power to destroy the freedom of
the press, the trial by jury, or even to regulate the course of descents, or the
forms of conveyances, must be very singularly expressed by the terms "to
raise money for the general welfare."
But what color can the objection have, when a specification of the
objects alluded to by these general terms immediately follows, and is not even separated
by a longer pause than a semicolon? If the different parts of the same
instrument ought to be so expounded, as to give meaning to every part which
will bear it, shall one part of the same sentence be excluded altogether from a
share in the meaning; and shall the more doubtful and indefinite terms be
retained in their full extent, and the clear and precise expressions be denied any
signification whatsoever? For what purpose could the enumeration of particular
powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant to be included in the preceding
general power? Nothing is more natural nor common than first to use a general
phrase, and then to explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars. But the
idea of an enumeration of particulars which neither explain nor qualify the
general meaning, and can have no other effect than to confound and mislead, is
an absurdity, which, as we are reduced to the dilemma of charging either on the
authors of the objection or on the authors of the Constitution, we must take
the liberty of supposing, had not its origin with the latter.
The objection here is the more extraordinary, as it appears that the
language used by the convention is a copy from the articles of Confederation. The
objects of the
Publius (James Madison)
No. 46
State and
Federal Powers Compared
To the People of the State of
Resuming the subject of the last paper, I proceed to inquire whether the
federal government or the State governments will have the advantage with regard
to the predilection and support of the people. Notwithstanding the different modes
in which they are appointed, we must consider both of them as substantially
dependent on the great body of the citizens of the
Many considerations, besides those suggested on a former occasion, seem
to place it beyond doubt that the first and most natural attachment of the
people will be to the governments of their respective States. Into the
administration of these a greater number of individuals will expect to rise. From
the gift of these a greater number of offices and emoluments will flow. By the
superintending care of these, all the more domestic and personal interests of
the people will be regulated and provided for. With the affairs of these, the
people will be more familiarly and minutely conversant. And with the members of
these, will a greater proportion of the people have the ties of personal
acquaintance and friendship, and of family and party attachments; on the side of
these, therefore, the popular bias may well be expected most strongly to
incline.
Experience speaks the same language in this case. The federal administration,
though hitherto very defective in comparison with what may be hoped under a
better system, had, during the war, and particularly whilst the independent
fund of paper emissions was in credit, an activity and importance as great as it
can well have in any future circumstances whatever. It was engaged, too, in a
course of measures which had for their object the protection of every thing
that was dear, and the acquisition of every thing that could be desirable to
the people at large. It was, nevertheless, invariably found, after the transient
enthusiasm for the early Congresses was over, that the attention and attachment
of the people were turned anew to their own particular governments; that the
federal council was at no time to idol of popular favor;p and that opposition to
proposed enlargements of its powers and importance was the side usually taken
by the men who wished to build their political consequence on the prepossessions
of their fello-citizens.
If, therefore, as has been elsewhere remarked, the people should in
future become more partial to the federal than to the State governments, the
change can only result from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration,
as will overcome all their antecedent propensities. And in that case, the people
ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where
they may discover it to be most due; but even in that case the State
governments could have little to apprehend, because it is only within a certain
sphere that the federal power can, in the nature of things, be advantageously
administered.
The remaining points on which I propose to compare the federal and
State governments, are the disposition and the faculty they may respectively
possess, to resist and frustrate the measures of each other.
It has been already proved that the members of the federal will be more
dependent on the members of the State governments, than the latter will be on the
former. It has appeared also, that the prepossessions of the people, on whom
both will depend, will be more on the side of the State governments, than of
the federal government. So far as the disposition of each towards the other may
be influenced by these causes, the State governments must clearly have the advantage.
But in a distinct and very important point of view, the advantage will lie on the
same side. The prepossessions, which the members of the State governments will
carry into the public councils a bias in favor of the general government. A local
spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members of Congress, than a national
spirit will prevail in the legislatures of the particular States. Every one knows
that a great proportion of the errors committed by the State legislatures proceeds
from the disposition of the members to sacrifice the comprehensive and
permanent interest of the State, to the particular and separate views of the
counties or districts in which they reside. And if they do not sufficiently
enlarge their policy to embrace the collective welfare of their particular
State, how can it be imagined that they will make the aggregate prosperity of
the
Were it admitted, however, that the Federal government may feel an equal
disposition with the State governments to extend its power beyond the due
limits, the latter would still have the advantage in the means of defeating
such encroachments. If an act of a particular State, though unfriendly to the national
government, be generally popular in that State, and should not too grossly violate
the oaths of the State officers, it is executed immediately and, of course, by
means on the spot and depending on the State alone. The opposition of the
federal government, or the interposition of federal officers, would but inflame
the zeal of all parties on the side of the State, and the evil could not be
prevented or repaired, if at all, without the employment of means which must always
be resorted to with reluctance and difficulty. On the other hand, should an
unwarrantable measure of the federal government be unpopular in particular
States, which would seldom fail to be the case, or even a warrantable measure be
so which may sometimes be the case, the means of opposition to it are powerful
and at hand. The disquietude of the people; their repugnance and, perhaps,
refusal to cooperate with the officers of the Union; the frowns of the executive
magistracy of the State; the embarrassments created by legislative devices, which
would often be added on such occasions, would oppose, in any State,
difficulties not to be despised; would form, in a large State, very serious impediments;
and where the sentiments of several adjoining States happened to be in unison, would
present obstructions which the federal government would hardly be willing to
encounter.
But ambitious encroachments of the federal government, on the authority
of the State governments, would not excite the opposition of a single State, or
of a few States only. They would be signals of general alarm. Every government would
espouse the common cause. A correspondence would be opened. Plans of resistance
would be concerted. One spirit would animate and conduct the whole. The same
combinations, in short, would result from an apprehension of the federal, as
was produced by the dread of a foreign, yoke; and unless the projected
innovations should be voluntarily renounced, the same appeal to a trial of
force would be made in the one case as was made in the other. But what degree
of madness could ever drive the federal government to such an extremity. In the
contest with
The only refuge left for those who prophesy the downfall of the State
governments is the visionary supposition that the federal government may previously
accumulate a military force for the projects of ambition. The reasonings contained
in these papers must have been employed to little purpose indeed, if it could be
necessary now to disprove the reality of this danger. That the people and the States
should, for a sufficient period of time, elect an uninterrupted succession of men
ready to betray both; that the traitors should, throughout this period,
uniformly and systematically pursue some fixed plan for the extension of the
military establishment; that the governments and the people of the States
should silently and patiently behold the gathering storm, and continue to
supply the materials, until it should be prepared to burst on their on heads,
must appear to every one more like the incoherent dreams of a delirious jealousy,
or the misjudged exaggerations of a counterfeit zeal, than like the sober apprehensions
of genuine patriotism. Extravagant as the supposition is, let it however be
made. Let a regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be
formed; and let it be entirely at the devotion of the federal government: still
it would not be going too far to say, that the State governments with the people
on their side, would be able to repel the danger. The highest number to which,
according to the best computation, a standing army can be carried in any
country, does not exceed one hundredth part of the whole number of souls; or
one twenty-fifth part of the number able to bear arms. This proportion would not
yield, in the
The argument under the present head may be put into a very concise form,
which appears altogether conclusive. Either the mode in which the federal
government is to be constructed will render it sufficiently dependent on the
people, or it will not. On the first supposition, it will be restrained by that
dependence from forming schemes obnoxious to their constituents. On the other supposition,
it will not possess the confidence of the people, and its schemes of usurpation
will be easily defeated by the State governments, who will be supported by the
people.
On summing up the considerations stated in this and the last paper, they
seem to amount to the most convincing evidence, that the powers proposed to be lodged
in the federal government are as little formidable to those reserved to the
individual States, as they are indispensably necessary to accomplish the purposes
of the Union; and that all those alarms which have been sounded, of a meditated
and consequential annihilation of the State governments, must, on the most favorable
interpretation, be ascribed to the chimerical fears of the authors of them.
Publius (James Madison)